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=h1Russia and the CIS in 2017@ 
 ‘Russia in Asia: succumbing to China’s embrace?’ 
 
=S1ABSTRACT@ 
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s ‘eastward pivot’ has intensified: 
mainly observable as strengthened relations with China, which appear to be 
evolving into a quasi-alliance. This places in question Russian attempts at 
diversification in Asia-Pacific, and its position in Central Asian where China’s Belt 
and Road initiative challenges Russian influence. 
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RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA remains central for Russia’s relations with 
Central Asian countries, but also for its relations with the broader Asia-Pacific. 
Since 2014, Russia’s relations with China appear to have strengthened 
further: the economic impact of sanctions and the drop in oil price has 
intensified their economic relationship while simultaneously exacerbating the 
asymmetry of relations. Many commentators suggest that Russia is now not 
only pivoting to Asia, but also pursuing a full-fledged alliance with its East 
Asian neighbor. It is argued here that Russia’s China policy is a strategic 
partnership that is more than an “axis of convenience,”1 but less than a full-
blown alliance. 
For some in Russia the pivot to Asia is partly explained by the 
confrontation with the West: “Russia needs the turn toward Asia to gain more 
confidence and become less vulnerable to these aggressive attacks.” 2 . 
Further, the development of Siberia and the Far East is a central part of Asia-
Pacific policy, which is seen as preserving stability in the event of long-term 
confrontation with the West. 
 Russia and China certainly agree on many international issues; for 
example, they both resist “regime change” and “color revolutions” (which 
extend to the Arab revolutions). While China was until recently a regular 
abstainer at the UN, it has now become more active in international issues, 
and has joined with Russia to veto Security Council action on Syria.  
                                                 
1 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2008. 
2 Evgeny Kanaev and Timofei Bordachev, ‘Russia’s New Strategy in Asia’, Russia in Global 
Affairs,  http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-New-Strategy-in-Asia-16997,2014, last 
accessed 03.10.2017. 
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 But despite appearances, Russia and China do not always present a 
united front. Just as in 2008 Chin, unlike Russia, refused to recognize the 
declarations of independence from Georgia3 by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
it has also been cautious in supporting Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In a 
similar vein, Russia has been ambivalent regarding Chinese actions in the 
South China Sea. 
 Despite often rather optimistic analyses of bilateral relations, voices in 
Russia advise caution, suggesting that Moscow too often follows China’s lead. 
One Russian scholar close to the Kremlin emphasizes that, “China and the 
Chinese leaders have played an exceptionally important role in the difficult 
period from 2014 to 2016 by making it easier for Russia to uphold its 
interests.” However, he warns that “with this paradigm still in existence, 
Russia will never be able to take decisions interfering with the Chinese 
interests.”4 Chinese support provides succor at a time when Russia has few 
friends, but this may come at a price: for example, Moscow may be 
increasingly called upon to support China in territorial disputes in the Asia-
Pacific.  
 The general trend has been for Sino–Russian trade to be on the 
decline: Chinese exports to Russia fell by 36% in the first half of 2014, and 
trade stalled at US$ 90 billion. In 2015 the figure fell to around US$ 64 billion 
and recovered only slightly, to US$ 66 billion, in 2016. An economic slowdown 
in China meant less demand for key Russian goods such as metal and 
                                                 
3 South Ossetia and Abkhazia were both ‘autonomous’ regions within the Georgian Soviet Republic, 
and remained as such after the collapse of the USSR, although both had declared independence in the 
1990s. 
4 Timofei Bordachev, “To Russia’s Friends in Asia and Beyond,” Valdai Discussion Club, 2017.  
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chemicals, while the share of oil and hydrocarbons in total exports to China 
increased from around 50% in 2008 to nearly 70% in 2013.  
 The large-scale gas project, Power of Siberia, has been touted as a 
landmark deal. Russian commentators play up the long-term prospects, 
predicting that “Russian gas supplies to China alone are expected to equal 
those to Europe in 10 to 12 years, which will take the Russian-Chinese 
strategic partnership to a new level and consolidate Russia’s and China’s 
roles in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.”5 Yet the launch was 
postponed from 2018 to 2019, possibly even to 2021, with the gas supply only 
reaching the agreed-upon amount by 2024. Moreover, supplying China will 
not substitute for the European energy market. It is widely expected that 
instead there will be a reorientation of Russian gas toward Europe.  
 Further development plans for the Siberian and Far Eastern regions 
have been dropped due to lack of resources as a result of the economic 
downturn. This region more than any other represents a litmus test of 
Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy. It has been suggested that a failure to integrate 
the region with broader integrative processes would consign it to the status of 
a “double periphery”—that is, a region on the periphery not only of the Asia-
Pacific, but also of European Russia. 
 With the rolling out of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, Russia 
hopes to benefit from Chinese economic success and for the Russian Far 
                                                 
5 Evgeny Kanaev and Timofei Bordachev, “Russia’s New Strategy in Asia,” Russia in Global Affairs, 
September 23, 2014, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-New-Strategy-in-Asia-16997>, 
accessed September 10, 2017. 
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East to reap the rewards, but there is a lack of clarity regarding Chinese 
plans. The new Eastern Economic Forum series that began in 2015 is seen 
as key to the future of the Russian Far East and its integration with the Asia-
Pacific; a third forum took place in 2017. The series is attended by high-level 
political figures and business leaders, including representatives from Japan, 
and various mechanisms have been established to attract foreign investment 
(most importantly the Advanced Special Economic Zones and the new Free 
Port of Vladivostok). Various draft agreements were signed on possible plans 
for Japan to invest in energy projects relating to the Northern Sea Route, a 
shipping route running along the Russian Arctic coast, via Siberia, to the 
Bering Strait. Russia hopes that when ice-free, the route will be used to ship 
Russian Arctic resources  (goods and project cargo for a proposed LNG port, 
oil and gas fields) and industrial products to both European and Asian 
markets. 
 China and India together make up more than half of Russian arms 
sales, but Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia are also important 
customers, and Asia represented 70% of Russia’s total arms exports in 2000–
16. In fact, Russia supplied 43% of all arms exported to the Asia-Pacific in 
2000–16.6 
In the wider region, the joint exercises in the Joint-Sea 2017 
Programme 2014 held in Vladivostok, headquarters of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, 
including submarine rescue and anti-submarine drills, in the Sea of Japan, like 
those in 2016 in the South China Sea, caused widespread alarm in the region. 
                                                 
6 Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and 
Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia, Research Paper, Chatham House, London, 2017. 
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But Russia has not given unqualified support to China on territorial issues in 
the South China Sea. For example, the Russian ambassador to the 
Philippines affirmed that Russia shared regional concerns about freedom of 
navigation.   
This provoked Chinese commentators to criticize Russia’s lack of support for 
China’s “nine-dash line” marking its territorial claims in the South China Sea in 
adhering to the “freedom of navigation” debates. 
Japanese voices, such as the Institute for Defense Studies, have 
stated that concern, even fear, of the ‘potential dangers posed by this Russo-
Chinese “united front against Japan”’ prompted Tokyo to push for high-level 
meetings with the Russian president, leading to the December 2016 summit 
with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. 7  There has been a huge increase in 
diplomatic activity between Russia and Japan since 2016, including the 
drafting of an eight-point cooperation plan around the Putin–Abe summit, as 
well as meetings involving regional leaders and Russia’s Far Eastern 
development minister. In 2018 a summit is planned to cap a proposed Year of 
Japan in Russia and Year of Russia in Japan.  
 Public opinion in Russia on the territorial dispute over four islands 
taken by Russia after World War Two, but claimed by Japan-the Kurils (or 
Northern Territories in Japan) remains uncompromising, even more since 
Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. The official Russian view remains that 
progress can only be made if Japan fully recognizes the results of World War 
                                                 
7 National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2016, Tokyo. 
7 
 
II, including the “enemy clause” of the UN Charter, Article 107 8 . A not 
untypical view of relations with Japan states: “The issue of territorial 
delimitation has already been decided by history, and any discussion of the 
matter should be concerned only with the conditions for using (including 
jointly) the territories in question without changing the status quo with regard 
to sovereign control over them.”9  
As before, Japan will only sign a peace treaty once there has been 
agreement on territorial concessions, while Russia insists on signing a peace 
treaty first, and only then discussing territorial issues. Interestingly, however, 
there is much discussion of joint economic development of the islands, which 
was one of the proposals put forward during the Yeltsin years (1991-1999)—
although issues of sovereignty will make this difficult. Despite promising signs, 
bilateral trade in 2016 fell to US$ 16 billion, from around US$ 21 billion in 
2015, in part due to sanctions, although on the Japanese side they are 
relatively weak and symbolic.10 
Like China, Russia has generally been reluctant to strengthen 
sanctions on Pyongyang, although the interests of China and Russia do not 
                                                 
8 ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which, 
during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter…’ 
9 Konstantin Shvydko, “Russia–Japan Political Dialogue at the Highest Levels: Opportunities and 
Perspectives,” Russian International Affairs Council, May 15, 2017, 
<http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-japan-political-dialogue-at-the-
highest-level-opportunities-and-perspectives-/, accessed November 10, 2017. 
10 Federal Customs Service, Russian Federation, “Foreign Trade Statistics,” 
<http://www.customs.ru/index2.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24785:----------2016--
&catid=125:2011-02-04-16-01-54&Itemid=1976>, accessed November 17, 2017. 
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always coincide. It was thus a surprise when Russia and China both 
supported a strengthening of sanctions in autumn 2017. Russia had been 
taken aback when China joined the US in drawing up sanctions against the 
DPRK in 2015, which threatened Russian economic interests. Moscow tends 
to see the future of the peninsula in terms of a gradual integration of the North 
into the South—this is of course very different from the US policy of regime 
change, but also markedly different from China’s policy, which prefers to 
maintain the status quo of two Koreas. Russia therefore tries to ensure good 
economic and trade relations with the DPRK, because of the importance to 
Moscow of participating in “the future opening up of North Korea.” Russia’s 
policy of continuing to supply oil to the DPRK despite sanctions can be seen 
in this light. 
South Korea has generally taken a positive view of Russia, but 
relations have been chilled by the Ukrainian crisis as well as Russia’s 
condemnation with China of the THAAD missile deployment in South Korea 
by the US. Moscow and Beijing have both proposed a “double freeze,” which 
calls for the US to abandon joint exercises with Japan and South Korea in 
exchange for the DPRK’s suspending its nuclear missile testing. 
=S1CENTRAL ASIA@  
=s2Uzbekistan@ 
With respect to Central Asia, Russia has tried to keep a balanced and 
cooperative approach to all the republics, exercising its relative strength but at 
the same time carefully refraining from any form of interference. Such regional 
engagement has to be discussed from a twofold perspective: bilateral 
relations, and multilateral relations within intergovernmental organizations. 
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The litmus test, in this respect, has been the forging of new relations with 
Uzbekistan, now under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, after 
Islam Karimov’s death last year. Relations with Uzbekistan have developed 
cordially and productively, although it should be noted that, departing from 
what seems to be a consolidated diplomatic protocol in Central Asia, 
Mirziyoyev’s first trip abroad after the election was not to Russia but to 
neighboring Turkmenistan. From an economic perspective, there has been a 
significant rise in Russian–Uzbek trade turnover, which grew by 20% in the 
first eight months of 2017, while on the security side there is discussion of a 
military agreement between the two parties, which would include procedures 
for mutual deliveries of military products, and establishment of a favorable 
regime for cooperation in development, production, operation, repair, 
modernization, and utilization of weapons and military equipment.11  
=s2Kyrgyzstan@ 
Toward Kyrgyzstan, which held the first authentic “free and fair” presidential 
elections in the 26 years of independence of Central Asia, Russia has 
maintained a neutral approach. It has written off Kyrgyzstan’s debt, and 
emphasized economic cooperation and military/security dialogue, but carefully 
avoided interfering in the run-up to the elections last month, which Sooronbai 
Zheenebekov won with an absolute majority. The same prudent, cautious 
stance was adopted with respect to a recent spat between Kazakhstan and 
                                                 
11 “Putin Lauds Russia-Uzbekistan Trade Growth at Meeting with Uzbek President,” Russia & 
CIS Business and Financial Newswire, October 11, 2017. On military developments, see “Putin 
Instructs to Hold Negotiations with Uzbekistan on Arms Transfers,” UzDaily (English), November 6, 
2017. 
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Kyrgyzstan over restrictions on their border. This nominally stemmed from 
security and technical measures adopted by the Kazakh side but was 
allegedly retaliation for then-Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev’s 
acrimonious comments on Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his 
autocratic governance. At a recent Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Sapar Isakov 
accused Bakytzhan Sagintayev, prime minister of Kazakhstan, of tightening 
the border purposefully, yet there was no mediatory gesture from Moscow, 
represented by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. 
 While this steadfast non-interference and non-intervention may puzzle 
some observers, given Russia’s notorious tendency to meddle in CIS 
members’ domestic affairs, it is consistent with a process of redefinition in the 
CIS of Russia’s status, which has been weakened by its actions in Crimea 
and Western Ukraine. One may argue, however, that Russia is likely to 
become more sensitive to this economic/diplomatic row if its own business 
and trade turnover within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is affected.  
 
=S2Kazakhstan@ 
In regard to Kazakhstan, relations have been substantially positive, with 
mutual trade turnover increasing by 34% between January and September 
2017.12 At the same time, Astana’s plan to shift its national Kazakh alphabet 
                                                 
12 Frol Leandoer, “Kazakh-Russian Trade Turnover to Grow up to 40 percent This Year, Says 
Russian Trade Representative,” Astana Times, September 11, 2017, 
<https://astanatimes.com/2017/09/kazakh-russian-trade-turnover-to-grow-up-to-40-percent-this-year-
says-russian-trade-representative/>. 
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from Cyrillic to Latin script may spur negative political consequences, for 
example by eliciting protests and grievances from the Russian 
population in the country. It should be noted that the shift is mainly 
intended to facilitate business interaction, integration with the global 
educational community, and various aspects of modernization, and that such 
move is not a new one in post-Soviet Eurasia, as it reflects the language 
policies of neighboring countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. Furthermore, the status of the Russian language in Kazakhstan, 
as well as the teaching thereof, remains unchanged.13  This was recently 
noted by the Russian ambassador to Kazakhstan, who argued that the 
change in script was an internal affair. Yet, it is undeniable that two key 
components of Russia’s “soft power” in the region, language and culture, are 
being weakened.  
=S2Tajikistan and Turkmenistan@ 
Finally, we turn to Russia’s relations with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. As far 
as Tajikistan is concerned, relations with Russia are positive overall, although 
some issues remain regarding the status of migrant workers in Russia, and 
the potential link between migration and terrorism, which resurfaced after the 
                                                 
13 “Kazakhstan to Switch from Cyrillic to Latin Alphabet,” Al-Jazeera, October 28, 2017, 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/kazakhstan-switch-cyrillic-latin-alphabet-
171028013156380.html>; Aktan Rysaliev, “Kazakhstan: President Calls for Switch to Latin 
Alphabet by 2025,” Eurasianet.org, April 12, 2017, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/83206>. On 
Russia’s response, see “Russia Respects Kazakh Switching to Latin-Based Alphabet – 
Ambassador,” Kazinform, October 30, 2017, <http://www.inform.kz/en/russia-respects-kazakh-
switching-to-latin-based-alphabet-ambassador_a3080092>. 
12 
 
terrorist act in the Saint Petersburg metro on April 3, 2017. 14  Again, a 
nuanced and balanced approach generally prevails. Relations between 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon are 
friendly and based on mutual trust, to the point that Putin has awarded 
Rahmom the prestigious Order of Alexander Nevsky, thanking him “for his 
great personal contribution to strengthening the strategic partnership and 
alliance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan, as 
well as ensuring stability and security in Central Asia.”15 Putin also awarded 
Tajik Foreign Minister Sirodjidin Aslov the Order of Friendship.  
On the other hand, growing ethno-nationalism in Russia is making the 
lives of Tajik immigrants, and Central Asian immigrants more generally, 
difficult. In September 2017, some 250 Tajiks were detained in Moscow after 
clashes in a shopping mall with the police, who gave the migrants a severe 
beating. But the overall number of Central Asian migrants in Russia is 
decreasing, and consequently, so are remittances sent back to the home 
country. This, together with the fact that Moscow is considering investing in 
mineral development projects in Tajikistan, may explain why Rahmon has not 
loudly protested the Russian police’s actions.16 
                                                 
14 On April 3 2017, a bomb detonated on a train travelling through a tunnel between the Sennaya 
Ploshchad and Tekhnologichesky Institut stations of the Saint Petersburg Metro. According to 
the Investigative Committee of Russia, the terrorist attack was committed by a 22-year-old 
Kyrgyz citizen Akbarjon Jalilov, and another man, the Tajik citizen Sodik Ortikov, was charged 
under articles ‘Terrorism’" and ‘Illicit arms trafficking’ of the Russian Criminal Code. “Russia: 
Tajik citizen Sodik Ortikov charged in St. Petersburg metro terror attack complicity,” Ferghana 
News, April 25, 2017, <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=3310&mode=snews> 
15 “Putin Thanks Rahmon for Strengthening Bilateral Relations, Awards Him Order of 
Alexander Nevsky,” Central Asia General Newswire, February 27, 2017. 
16 “Several Tajik Migrants Detained in Moscow after Protest over Beating,” Radio Free Europe 
/ Radio Liberty, September 21, 2017, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-tajikistan-migrants-
beating/28748744.html>; “Rahmon Hails Russian Companies’ Participation in Mineral 
13 
 
As for Turkmenistan, relations with Russia have always been erratic, 
oscillating between enthusiastic cooperation and almost open hostility. In the 
past, issues pertaining to dual citizenship for Russians in Turkmenistan and 
gas-transit prices have significantly strained relations between Moscow and 
Ashgabat. Yet, 2017 may well be remembered as a relatively positive year in 
bilateral relations. In a meeting last October, Putin and Turkmen President 
Gurbanguly Mälikgulyýewiç Berdymuhammedov signed a strategic-
partnership agreement, which aims to develop relations in key sectors such 
as economy, security, humanitarian initiatives, and culture. An 
interparliamentary cooperation agreement was signed in April 2017,17  and 
Berdymuhammedov, too, was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky, in 
what seems to be an attempt by Russia to retain, if not control, the loyalty of 
Central Asian leaders so as to enhance and entrench its influence in the area. 
=S2Regional International Organizations@ 
In this respect, the international organization concerned with security in 
Eurasia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, should be mentioned. 
The most interesting development here is the renewed commitment of its 
members, and the decision of Russia to invest more in it.18 It is not by chance 
that, after recent speculation and rumors about China’s encroachment in 
Central Asia, Russia has supplied Tajikistan with modernized military 
equipment, Kyrgyzstan has flirted with hosting a second Russian military 
                                                                                                                                           
Development Projects in Tajikistan at Meeting with Putin,” Central Asia General Newswire, 
October 11, 2017. 
17 “Turkmenistan, Russia Sign Inter-parliamentary Cooperation Deal,” Central Asian News 
Service, April 8, 2017. 
18 CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. 
Afghanistan and Serbia are non-member observer states. 
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base, and Russia has begun sharing Special Operations Forces experiences 
with other member countries.19  
From a multilateral perspective, there are a few important 
developments to consider. This year marked the first expansion of 
membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with the 
addition in June 2017 of India and Pakistan to the group already including 
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. At a 
meeting in June in Astana, the presidents of the member states signed a 
declaration on combating extremism and international terrorism, and 
reiterated their commitment to a peaceful, non-military solution to the Afghan 
issue. But aside from this, the SCO did not significantly contribute to political 
or security-related events in the region in 2017, and unusually, no military 
exercises were held. Some suggest that the entry of India and Pakistan 
signals a downgrading or dilution of the SCO, especially given the diverging 
views between Russia and China on its future tasks. Russia has always 
resisted China’s attempt to turn the SCO into an economic and energy club, 
while China has often been depicted as a free-rider on Russia for regional 
security. With the rolling out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the future role 
of the SCO becomes an open question, especially as differences between 
Russia, China, Pakistan, and India regarding Afghanistan could complicate 
coordination on regional issues.  
                                                 
19 “Russia to Share Special Operations Forces Experience with CSTO allies – Putin,” Central 
Asia General Newswire, April 12, 2017. On Chinese military presence in Central Asia, see Stephen 
Blank, “New Signs of Chinese Military Interest in Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 
January 16, 2017, <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13421-new-signs-
of-chinese-military-interest-in-central-asia.html>.  
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The third multilateral organization on Central Asian territory, the EEU, 
is still evolving. While in 2016 trends in foreign and intra-regional trade were 
negative and declining, in January–November 2017 both aspects of trade 
were on the rise.20 As mentioned above, it remains to be seen what impact, if 
any, the Kazakh–Kyrgyz spat will have on the macroeconomic dynamics of 
the EEU.  
The bigger question relates to the Belt and Road Initiative: the 
cooperation agreement between the EEU and the initiative, signed in May 
2017, could be a way for Putin to win time rather than anything more 
substantial. Yet Russia has held up the agreement as a game-changer for the 
region, with Putin describing it as a “greater Eurasian partnership,” crucial not 
just for the Central Asian region but also for the broader Asia-Pacific region 
and for creating a network of states to link economies and markets.21   
 
 
                                                 
20 “Statistika vneshnei i vzaimnoi torgovli tovarami” (“Statistics of foreign and mutual trade in 
goods”) 
<http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/tradestat/Pages/default.aspx>. 
For an academic, comprehensive study of recent macroeconomic trends in the EEU, see Evgeny 
Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union: Current State and Preliminary Results,” Russian Journal 
of Economics 3(1):54–70, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405473917300041>. 
21 Vladimir Putin, “Russia’s Role in Securing Asia’s Prosperity,” Bloomberg View, November 8, 
2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-08/vladimir-putin-russia-s-role-in-securing-
asia-s-prosperity>, accessed November 15, 2017. 
